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I 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
i 
Whether the Utah State Tax Commission erred in denying Summit Operating, 
LLC a tax exemption from the state oil and gas severance tax by ruling that the word 
"started" in the phrases "production for development wells started after January 1, 1990" 
and "production for wildcat wells started after January 1, 1990" in Utah Code Ann. §59-
5-102(5) (2008) means "spudded" and does not modify the word production.
 ( 
SUMMARY OF THE REPLY ARGUMENT 
The issue as presented by the Utah State Tax Commission (the "Commission") ' 
must be rejected because the Commission never found that the Horsehead Point 18-44 
well (the "Well") produced or had a taxable event prior to 1990. 
The removal of the word "spudded" from a legislative working draft of House Bill 
110 unequivocally shows legislative intent and establishes that the Utah State Legislature 
(the "Legislature") never intended for "started" to mean "spudded". The Commission's 
substitution of the word "started" with the word "spudded" is an abuse of discretion, not 
supported by law, and is reversible error. 
The Commission's assertion that the Legislature intended the tax incentives 
provided in House Bill 110 only for oil and gas exploration and drilling and not 
production is an arbitrary and unsubstantiated determination contrary to the clear intent of 
legislative history of the statute to aid an ailing oil and gas industry in the State of Utah. 
4 
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DETAIL OF THE REPLY ARGUMENT 
PARTI 
Brief of Appellee Utah State Tax Commission's "ISSUES PRESENTED FOR 
REVIEW" Is In Error 
Summit disputes the Commission's "ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW" 
which states, "Did the Tax Commission correctly determine that Summit's well started 
before January 1, 1990 where the well was drilled, produced, completed and shut-in 
during 1983-1984?" (emphasis added on the disputed term). 
This matter was submitted for summary judgment based on undisputed facts. No 
finding was ever made that there was commercial or taxable "production" or that the 
Well "produced" prior to 1990 which Summit disputes. The Commission's attempt to 
present an inaccurate conclusion naturally leads to a faulty argument. There was no well 
production and the Commission itself never held there was. What the Commission 
accurately found in its Order is as follows in its "STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED 
FACTS" as part of its Order: "The Well was 'completed' and capable of producing 
natural gas on August 16, 1984. The completion process included 'testing' the Well, part 
of which involved a 'flow test' where natural gas was allowed to flow to measure 
production." (R. 066: 2 f 4). The Commission argues that a "flow test" is production. 
That is reversible error. Had there been "production" as contemplated in the tax code, the 
severance of hydorocarbons would have, by law, been taxed. A test flare where some 
5 
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i 
little gas is burned to establish the possible viability of a well does not constitute 
"production" for tax purposes. In fact, the Commission's findings of fact clearly establish 
only a flow test occurred and never made a finding of severance taxation prior to 
Summit's acquisition of the well. 
PART II 
Removal of the Word "Spudded55 From the Draft of the Bill Is Significant and Not 
Meaningless as Argued by the Commission 
The Commission argues that the removal of the word "spudded" from a working 
draft of House Bill 110 and replacement with the word "started" in the statutorytext is 
meaningless and inconsequential. The Commission hypothesizes in a way to put a 
favorable spin on a failing argument that it is "likely that our Legislature, looking at how 
other states define the term 'started/ deemed the terms synonymous when used in this 
context." (Brief of Appellee Utah State Tax Commission Pg. 14). The fact that the term 
"spudded" was replaced with "started" is neither indistinct nor a deep mystery, for that is 
what happened. If the Legislature had been impressed with other states using that specific 
and well understood term, it would have kept "spudded" in the statute. The removal must 
be considered intended and knowing. See Stamper v. Johnson, 232 P.3d 514, 517 (Utah 
2010). The Commission's argument that it knew of the term and then removed it counters 
the very conclusion it is pleading to the Court. Words have meaning and "spudded" was 
6 
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removed. This Court must look at what the Legislature left and not guess or hypothesize 
what the Legislature was thinking. 
The Legislature clearly did not keep the word "spudded". It chose to use "started". 
This legislative act obviously had a purpose and was intended. Id. The Commission itself 
legislated a change in the statute and is asking this Court to do the same by substituting 
the word "spudded" in place of the word "started". Such an act is contrary to the intent 
and beyond the authority of this Court. 
The Commission arbitrarily removed the word "started" from the statute by 
insisting that the Legislature really meant "spudded", a term that was specifically 
removed. It is an abuse of discretion for the Commission through administrative order to 
rewrite the statute by placing a word back into the statute which was intentionally 
removed by the Legislature in order to justify its own definition of the word "started". 
See Berrett v. Purser & Edwards, 876 P.2d 367, 370 (Utah 1994). Not only is the 
Commission rewriting the statute through an adjudication, it never defined "started" 
through administrative rule. Thus, parties like Summit must rely on what the code section 
actually states. It is simply legally impermissible for an administrative law judge and the 
Commission to rewrite the statute and improperly apply it against the Petitioner. This is 
an abuse of the Commission's discretion and delegated powers. 
This Court has held that neither agencies nor courts have the authority to rewrite 
legislation. In the case of Mini Spas, Inc., et al v. State of Utah et al, 657 P.2d 1348 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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I 
(Utah 1983), this Court was asked to resolve a dispute regarding the Massage Practice 
Act which required all technicians to be licensed by a Board of Massage; however, there 
could be no creation of a Board of Massage because it required four licensed technicians 
to sit on it. This Court held, "Having held that the Act cannot be rewritten by judicial 
intervention to permit the creation of a Board of Massage in the absence of licensed 
practitioners to sit on it, we further hold that no mandamus will lie to require the 
Department of Registration to implement the Act. Plaintiff must seek a solution to this 
problem from the Legislature." Id. at 1350. The Legislature, not this Commission or this 
Court can change the language of the statute. The Commission's attempt to do so must be 
rejected and the decision reversed in favor of the Petitioner. 
In addition, the Commission's reference to the dictionary definition of "start" to 
mean "spud" supports Summit's argument more than it does its own. Quoting the 
dictionary, the Commission identifies several possible definitions: "to begin an activity or 
movement", "to have a beginning: COMMENCE", "to begin". Each meaning supports 
Summit's contention that it is the beginning of production for purposes of tax law and is 
therefore consistent with the interpretation that "started" does not mean to "spudded" but 
refers to production. (See Brief of Appellee Pg. 7). 
The start of production on the Well was after the January 1, 1990 date found in the 
statute. (See R. 097: Plaintiffs Exhibit #3, Sundry Notice and Reports on Wells). That is 
consistent with the statute. 
8 
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The Commission's use of the term "completion, completed, etc." when referring to 
the term "started" has no application for purposes of taxation of production. The term 
"completion" is a technical term within the oil and gas industry which can refer to a dry 
hole or a well capable of producing oil or gas. See Smith v. Hayward, 193 F.2d 198, 200 
(Fed. Cir. 1951). There is no severance tax unless there is production. Summit reminds 
this Court that this case involves the interpretation of a tax law application and does not 
involve the application of oil and gas operations statutes which are administratively 
governed by the Utah Board of Oil, Gas and Mining. It is the Legislature's intent of 
giving tax incentives, not the application of what the Utah Board of Oil, Gas and Mining 
might view that is the issue here. In fact, "completion" is not found in the operative part 
of the statute in issue nor does it deal with production. Therefore, the Commission makes 
two errors by using the terms "spudded" and "completion" to refer to the term "started". 
Moreover, this flawed analysis illustrates the inherent confusion in the Commission's 
interpretative approach. One can easily ascertain when taxable "production for 
development wells started" but cannot know when "wells started". 
In an additional attempt to justify the unfounded denial of the exception, the 
Commission refers to the terms of a "standard lease" to bolster its definition of "started"; 
however, such reference is misplaced and not applicable even as a comparison. The case 
before the Court deals with statutory interpretation, not a negotiated lease where the 
parties to a lease are free to set forth lease terms which they can define however they 
choose. The current matter is not a lease but a statutory act. Therefore, the Commission 
9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
i 
cannot unilaterally choose terms it likes to the detriment of a third party who is bound by 
the statute. 
Because "started" refers to production, the Commission's entire argument about 
the grandfather clause is meaningless and of no value to the current case before the Court. 
Any well that began producing after 1984 but through 2004 was covered by such clause. 
Because the well in issue did not begin producing until 2008, it does not fall into the 
category addressed in the grandfather clause. 
Simply because the Commission wants the term "started" to mean "spudded" does 
not give it the right to change the statute through an adjudication process. Instead of 
defining "started" through rule, it waited over twenty years through this administrative 
process to impose an interpretation that is seriously flawed by substituting a new word 
not found in the statute. 
PART III 
Legislative Intent Was Not Limited to New Exploration and Drilling 
While the Commission's discussion on supporting new exploration and drilling 
within House Bill 110 is helpful in understanding the incentives to exempting periods of 
taxation on wells, its argument does not recognize that production is the operative and 
taxable event of the bill and subsequent statute. To suggest that the only incentivizing 
purpose of the statute was for new exploration and drilling is myopic at best because it 
10 
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severely limits the legislatively expressed purpose of the resulting statute and seeks to 
destroy the legislative intent. There is no severance tax on a dry hole or any well that 
does not produce oil or gas actually saved or sold in the market place. (Utah Code Ann. 
§59-5-102(1) and Utah Code Ann. §59-5-104(l)(a)). The statute's inclusion of a 
workover component negates any assertion that the bill was for the purpose of new 
exploration and drilling only, since a workover is an operation performed on an existing 
well to sustain, restore or increase production. (Utah Code Ann. § 59-5101(30)). 
Summit maintains that House Bill 110 was not only for new exploration and 
drilling but also to increase production from existing wells and for the production from 
wells that have never produced. A fair and reasonable reading of the presentment of the 
bill as shown in Exhibit F to the Commission's Brief of Appellee shows that a main 
thrust of the bill was to increase production of the State's hydrocarbon resources, as well 
as increase employment, to support an ailing oil and gas industry and create more 
revenue sources within the State of Utah which would then be taxed to increase State 
revenues. 
A few examples regarding production as found in Exhibit F to the Commission's 
Brief of Appellee include Representative Adams' statements, "...it simply becomes 
uneconomical for the oil company to explore or to drill or produce oil in this state." 
(Brief of Appelle. Appendix F, House Bill 110 - Session 2 & 3, Severance Tax 
Incentives for Petroleum Industry Recovery, Page 3), "the object is to produce new 
n Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 
oil.. .and to get the production of that well higher." (Brief of Appelle. Appendix F, House 
Bill 110 - Session 2 & 3, Severance Tax Incentives for Petroleum Industry Recovery, 
Page 3), and "...if we do not have some type of work over and some type of production 
enhancement in the [Uintah Basin] and in the oil wells they simply (sic), we run the risk < 
of never recovering those reserves." (Brief of Appelle. Appendix F, House Bill 110 — 
Session 2 & 3, Severance Tax Incentives for Petroleum Industry Recovery, Page 4). 
i 
To hold that reserves of gas from a well that has never produced is not the aim of 
the very statute that was enacted to get companies to create new sources of revenue and 
therefore bring tax revenues to the state is an unreasonable and arbitrary interpretation of 
the Legislature's intent. So holding is an abuse of the Commission's authority. 
The Well in question was shut-in for many years. Only by building a pipeline at a 
cost of over $900,000 could the State's natural resources be produced and enjoyed by its 
owners. The Dissent correctly recognized, "A shut in well is of no value to the State of 
Utah. It provides no jobs." (R. 66: Dissent). Only when the Well had a pipeline could it 
be produced. That is the purpose of the tax holiday, an incentive for increased oil and gas 
production. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner, Summit Operating, LLC, respectfully prays 
that the ruling of the Utah State Tax Commission be reversed and Petitioner be allowed 
the proper exemption from severance tax which it asserted. 
DATED this Z O day of S^rehB^- , 2011. 
Jgflmy C. Schwendiman (12652) 
Summit Operating, LLC 
1245 E. Brickyard Rd., Ste 210 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Telephone: (435) 940-9001 
ischwen@summitcorp.net 
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